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Emergence for Nihilists 
 
Richard L. J. Caves 
 
Abstract: I defend mereological nihilism, the view that there are no composite 
objects, against a challenge from ontological emergence, the view that some things 
KDYHSURSHUWLHVWKDWDUH¶VRPHWKLQJRYHUDQGDERYH·WKHSURSHUWLHVRIWKHLUSDUWVAs 
the nihilist does not believe in composite wholes, there is nothing in thH QLKLOLVW·V
ontology to instantiate emergent properties ² or so the challenge goes. However, I 
argue that some simples (taken together) can collectively instantiate an emergent 
property, so the QLKLOLVW·V RQWRORJ\ FDQ in fact accommodate emergent properties. 
Furthermore, I show that employing plural instantiation does not blRDWWKHQLKLOLVW·V
ontology or ideology. 
 
1. The Argument from Ontological Emergence 
Here I defend mereological nihilism against a challenge from ontological emergence. §1 briefly 
explains nihilism and ontological emergence then outlines the argument against nihilism from the 
existence of emergent properties (the No Bearers argument). In §2 I argue that the best solution 
is for the nihilist to employ plural instantiation, holding that emergent properties are collectively 
instantiated by multiple simples. §3 weighs up the ontological and ideological cost of introducing 
plural quantification ² necessary for making sense of plural instantiation ² LQWR WKH QLKLOLVW·V
theory. I conclude that the cost is negligible and so does not negate any of the claimed 
ontological or ideological parsimony advantages of nihilism. §4 defends and elaborates my views 
on ideological parsimony employed in the previous section, while §5 clarifies how my Plural 
Instantiation Strategy advances the debate and defends the strategy against an objection from the 
unity of consciousness. 
Suppose we have good reason to believe that wholes have novel properties over and above the 
properties of their parts. Next suppose ² in a drive for ontological austerity, perhaps ² that we 
get rid of the wholes from our theory: can we find a way to coherently continue to believe in the 
novel properties we once attributed to them? ,·P JRLQJ WR WU\ DQG FRQYLQFH \RX WKDW WKH
prospects for doing so are not as dim as they might seem at first glance. That is, I am going to 
defends Mereological Nihilism (nihilism) ² my favoured answer to the Special Composition 
Question (SCQ) ² against an argument from the possibility of Ontological Emergence 
(emergence). 
SCQ: Under what circumstances, when we have some things, do they compose some 
further thing?1  
There are numerous potential answers to SCQ. Most answers place some non-trivial 
restriction on when composition occurs and when it does not. These restrictivist answers range 
IURPQDwYHDQVZHUV VXFKDV ¶ZKHQ WKHREMHFWV DUH WRXFKLQJ· RU ¶ZKHQ WKHREMHFWV DUH IDVWHQHG
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WRJHWKHU·WRPRUHFRQVLGHUHGDQVZHUVVXFKDV¶ZKHQWKHREMHFWVSDUWLFLSDWHLQDOLIH·2 There are 
also two extreme answers to SCQ: Mereological Universalism places no restriction on 
composition. The universalist answers that whenever there are some things they always compose 
some further thing.3 The nihilist, on the other hand, says that when you have some things they 
never compose some further thing. As such, nihilism entails there are no composite objects: that 
when you have some things (maybe some subatomic particles), they never compose some further 
thing (such as a cat). Rather, there are just mereological simples, arranged in a variety of ways 
(cat-wise, for instance).4 Potential reasons for favouring nihilism include its ability to provide a 
uniform eliminative answer to a number of puzzles involving composite objects5 and its ability to 
provide us with a parsimonious ontology and ideology.6  However, my purpose here is not to 
argue that nihilism is the best answer to SCQ, but merely to defend it from the argument from 
emergence. Nihilists and believers in composition differ over whether or not composite objects 
exist, yet we have said nothing concerning the nature of composite objects³ what such objects 
are like, if they exist. One can, in principle, defend an answer to SCQ while remaining silent on 
WKLVIXUWKHUTXHVWLRQEXWDVZH·OOVHHWKHDUJXPHQWRQHPHUJHQFHSXWVSUHVVXUHRQLQWHUORFXWRUV
on both sides of the mereology debate to say something informative here.  
In particular, we can ask: are the properties of a whole necessarily derived from the intrinsic 
properties of its parts (and the spatial relations between them)? For example, that the egg is 
partly white and partially yellow (and the yellow part is inside the white part) would seem to be 
straightforwardly derived from it having a yellow part (the yoke) and a white part (and the yoke 
EHLQJORFDWHGLQVLGHWKHZKLWH2UPLJKWVRPHRIWKHZKROH·VSURSHUWLHVQRWEHGHULYDWLYHLQWKLV
way³ might they be something over and above these derivative properties? According to the 
believer in ontological emergence, it is at least sometimes the case that when you have some 
things and you arrange them in a certain way, you not only get some further object, but some 
further property ² an emergent property ² instantiated by that further thing. Emergent properties are 
supposed to be something genuinely in addition to; not metaphysically reducible to; the 
properties of the things you started out with: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts, 
having at least one property that is neither inherited from those parts, nor somehow derivative of 
the properties of those parts.7 More carefully: we should understand emergent properties as 
fundamental (non-derivative) properties which are distinct from, but are none the less dependent 
on, a set of fundamental microphysical base properties.8 Individual base properties are 
understood as instantiated by individual mereological simples, while any wholes composed of 
these simples will have properties that depend on these base properties: the question of 
ontological emergence is then whether any of these dependent properties are fundamental.9  
The most often discussed (putative) example of this phenomenon hails from the Philosophy 
of Mind: when you have some neurons and arrange them in a certain very special way ² brain-
wise, that is ² not only do you have some further object, a brain, the thought goes, but some 
further property (or properties) ² namely, phenomenal consciousness (or qualia) ² that is 
something genuinely over and above, or not metaphysically reducible to, all the properties of the 
individual neurons and the spatial relations between them taken together. Another important 
example is from Quantum Mechanics.10 Schaffer (2010), for instance, argues that an entangled 
quantum system has properties, such as spin, not reducible to the properties of its parts and the 
spatial relations betweeQWKHP)RUDQHQWDQJOHGHOHFWURQSDLU6FKDIIHUVD\V ¶DSXUHVSLQVWDWH
can be attributed to neither electron individually. A pure spin state can be attributed to the 
HOHFWURQSDLURQO\FROOHFWLYHO\ DV D V\VWHP· S*LYHQ WKDW WKH VSDWLDO UHODWLRQV between the 
particles are irrelevant to their colOHFWLYHVSLQDQGWUHDWLQJWKH¶V\VWHP· as the mereological sum 
of the two particles, we thus have an example a whole with properties genuinely over and above 
the properties of its parts.11  
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The prima facie challenge to the nihilist is fairly intuitive: LI \RX GRQ·W EHOLHYH LQ FRPSRVLWH
objects, how can you account for the existence of emergent properties? Assuming we have 
independent reason to believe in the existence of emergent properties, we have reason to posit 
composite objects as their bearers.  For suppose a believer in composite objects grants, for sake 
of argument, that we have no evidence for the existence of chairs over and above the evidence 
we have for believing in simples arranged chair-wise: That there appears to be a four-legged 
wooden object in region R, and that when I sit down in region R ,GRQ·WIDOORQWKHIORRULVMXVW
evidence for there being simples arranged chair-wise in region R ² LWGRHVQ·WWHOOEHWZHHQWKHUH
being some further object, a chair, in region R over and above the simples so arranged, on the 
one hand, and their being merely some simples arranged chair-wise on the other.  However, our 
believer might go on to say, the fact that I have (say) the subjective experience of diverse yet 
unified phenomenal feels ² i.e. the existence of emergent consciousness ² is evidence for the 
existence of some thing (a mind or brain) over and above the simples arranged brain-wise in the 
vicinity of my head.  
The crucial thought here is that emergent properties, such as consciousness, require the 
H[LVWHQFHRIDEHDUHUDQGWKHQLKLOLVWGRHVQ·WSURYLde any viable candidates to be suitable bearers 
of such properties. The nihilist only believes in simples: tiny (perhaps point-sized) mereological 
atoms that ² very plausibly ² lack the rich internal structure needed to be, for instance, thinking, 
feeling beings. One place where this issue plays out prominently in the literature is in relation to 
the respective cases presented by van Inwagen (1990) and Merricks (2001) for the systematic 
elimination of composite objects: both would entail nihilism, if not for the fact that both 
arguments allow that if a composite object has a property which is not reducible to the 
properties of its parts, i.e. an emergent property, then it is exempt from elimination. Van 
Inwagen (1990, p.118) argues that thinking is an activity that must be done by a single composite 
whole (such as a human being), since thinking cannot be done by many smaller things in the way 
many atoms can be arranged to perform the function of a shelf without actually composing a 
shelf (and no individual simple can think).12 Merricks (2001), meanwhile, is explicit that 
consciousness has powers not derived from its microphysical base, rejecting pure nihilism 
because of a belief that a given human being, by virtue of being conscious, possesses at least one 
propHUW\¶not, of metaphysical necessity, implied by the existence and intrinsic properties of, and 
spatiotemporal and causal interrelations DPRQJ >LWV@ FRQVWLWXHQW DWRPV· (p.89) Here we have a 
move from emergent consciousness to the failure of nihilism.  
Now, both van Inwagen and Merricks give reasons for believing that we ought to avoid 
eliminating us IURPRXUWKHRULHVLIDWDOOSRVVLEOHZKLFK,ZRQ·WJRLQWRKHUH+RZHYHUVXSSRVH
\RXZHUHLPSUHVVHGE\YDQ,QZDJHQRU0HUULFN·VJHQHUDOFDVHIRUWKHHOLPLQDWion of composite 
REMHFWVDQGZHUHQ·WDFWLYHO\ORRNLQJIRUDUHDVRQWRNHHSany such objects around: it would seem 
natural to try to move towards a more unified theory by getting rid of us along with everything 
else. What would stand in your way? Well, if wHJUDQWWKDWFRQVFLRXVQHVVLVDSURSHUW\WKDWFDQ·W
merely be explained by the intrinsic properties of individual simples and the external relations 
EHWZHHQ WKHP WKHQ LW VHHPV ZKDW ZH·UH ODFNLQJ LV D VXLWDEOH bearer for consciousness to, as it 
were, get the thinking done. Ex hypothesi, neither some simples being merely arranged thus-and-
so, nor any intrinsic property of any individual simple, can be numerically identical with any of 
the instances of consciousness we take to be instantiated in the world: but at first sight this 
exhausts all the options for the nihilist. Similarly, Schaffer (2007) argues that the nihilist cannot 
accommodate emergent properties ² at least not if she believes in a plurality of simples ² since 
wholes have spin properties that are not derivative from the spin of their parts and the (spatial, 
causal) external relations between them.13 So, we have fundamental holistic spin properties that 
need to be accommodated and no individual simple is a suitable bearer for the collective spin of 
more than one simple: the conclusion reached is that, with only simples in her ontology, the 
nihilist must say there is only one simple (the World) so that the only fundamental spin property 
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will be the intrinsic spin of that one simple. So, is pluralistic nihilism really incapable of 
accommodating these kinds of properties?  
%HIRUHPRYLQJRQWRSRWHQWLDOQLKLOLVWVROXWLRQVOHW·VJLYHDPRUHSUHFLVHIRUPXODWLRQRIWKH
argument against nihilism from emergence:   
7KH¶1R%HDUHUV·DUJXPHQW² 
P1. If a property is instantiated in the world, there exists a suitable bearer. 
P2. There are emergent properties instantiated in the world. 
P3. There exist suitable bearers for emergent properties (from P1 + P2). 
P4. If nihilism is true, the only possible bearers of any properties are mereological simples. 
P5. Mereological simples are not suitable bearers for emergent properties. 
P6. If nihilism is true, there are no suitable bearers for emergent properties (from P4 + P5). 
C1. Therefore: Nihilism is false (from P3 + P6). 
Potential replies to No Bearers on behalf of the nihilist will fall broadly into two camps: On 
the first, grant for sake of argument the assumption that there are emergent properties and show 
that the nihilist can provide suitable bearers for them (rejecting P6 via P5). In defending such 
lines of response, the nihilist need not be concerned, dialectally, with trying to provide their own 
detailed account of emergent properties or giving reason to think they are the best way 
explaining the target phenomenon: the nihilist will be able to say whatever her opponent says 
DERXWHPHUJHQWSURSHUWLHVDQGZK\WKH\·UHDSSOLFDEOHWRWKHWDUJHWSKHQRPHQD,IKHURSSRQHQW
is doomed to fail in this task, the nihilist is more or less off the hook: If P2 is false, there is no 
direct argument against nihilism from the existence of putatively emergent phenomena. The 
other style of response will deny that emergent properties provide the best account of putatively 
emergent phenomena such as phenomenal consciousness or quantum entanglement. Once we 
KDYHDQDOWHUQDWLYHDFFRXQWLWZLOOEHDUJXHGZH·OOVHHWKDWZHDOUHDG\KDYHDUHDG\H[SODQDWLRQ
of the problematic phenomena, and so positing emergent properties would be gratuitous. If 
there are no emergent properties, there need not exist suitable bearers (undercutting support for 
P3 via the denial of P2).  
Examples of this latter sort of response in the quantum mechanical case include the strategy 
of positing entanglement relations, and employing the ideology of metaphysical indeterminacy as 
an ontologically innocent stand-in for entanglement relations.14 In the Philosophy of Mind, any 
theory which seeks to explain consciousness as anything other than an emergent property ² e.g. 
eliminativism, reductive physicalism, Cartesian dualism ² falls into this camp. No such strategy 
will be discussed in detail in this paper. Instead, we will be interested in the question of whether, 
if we grant for sake of argument that there are emergent properties, the nihilist can 
accommodate them in her ontology. That is, whether suitable non-composite bearers can be 
found. 
In the search for a non-composite bearer for emergent properties, this paper grants for the 
sake of argument the assumption that a lone simple is not a suitable bearer for an emergent 
SURSHUW\ ,W·V ZRUWK IODJJLQJ XS KRZHYHU WKDW WKHUH DUH VRPH LQWHUHVWLQJ RSWLRQV ZRUWK
considering before giving up on lone simples as bearers of emergent properties. After all, 
individual microphysical particles DUHQ·W VXLWDEOH EHDUHUV IRU SURSHUWLHV such as phenomenal 
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consciousness or entangled spin properties, but why assume all simples are microphysical 
SDUWLFOHV" )RU LQVWDQFH ZK\ FRXOGQ·W ZKDWHYHU REMHFW LQ IDFW LQVWDQWLDWHV P\ FRQVFLRXVQHVV ² 
ZKLFK , WDNH IRU JUDQWHG LVQ·W D PLFURSK\VLFDO SDUWLFle ² be mereologically simple? The most 
persuasive objection, I think, is that simples lack the requisite internal structure to instantiate a 
rich, complicated macro-property such as consciousness, which is presumed to be the product of 
the interactions of countless micro-particles in very particular arrangements.15 That is, you might 
think that simples necessarily lack internal heterogeneity by virtue of their simplicity: a simple 
FDQ·W KDYH D SRVLWLYH HOHFWULF FKDUJH here, and a negative electrical charger there, for instance, 
because this requires having some proper part that is positively charged simpliciter, and some 
distinct proper part that is negatively charged simpliciter, and simples by definition have no proper 
parts (see McDaniel 2007). However, there have been some compelling arguments put forward 
in the literature to show that simples could be heterogeneous and spatially extended by 
possessing fundamental distributional properties: e.g. the property of being positively-charged-
here-and-negatively-charged-there, where this property is not had by virtue of it or its parts 
possessing any non-distributional charge properties.16 If this is right ² if mereologically simple 
things could have limitless internal heterogeneity by instantiating irreducible distributional 
properties ² the main objection to simples not being suitable bearers for emergent properties is 
undercut. 
So, could the object (my brain?) that instantiates my consciousness be a heterogeneous 
extended simple? One that emerges from the microphysical base in much the same way as my 
consciousness is being supposed to emerge, as effectively a purpose-built bearer for my 
emergent consciousness? Although this may seem outlandish, I would need convincing that ² 
when the proposal is properly chewed over and digested ² it is any more strange or 
counterintuitive than the emergence of the property of consciousness itself. However, although I 
WKLQNWKLVRSWLRQZDUUDQWVDIXOOGLVFXVVLRQ,·PFXWWLQJLWVKRUWWRH[SORUHDQRWKHUSRVVLELOLW\,
take to be promising: plural instantiation. This strategy will be explained in the next section and 
be our focus for the remainder of the paper. 17   
 
2. The Plural Instantiation Strategy 
Perhaps numerous simples, acting together, could instantiate an emergent property? That is, 
perhaps there are emergent property instances that, instead of having a single bearer, have 
multiple bearers, which jointly bring about the conditions necessary for the emergent property to 
EH LQVWDQWLDWHG /HW·V FDOO WKLV SOXUDO RU FROOHFWLYH LQVWDQWLDWLRQ $V ,·OO EH DUJXLQJ SOXUDO
instantiation is a possibility we should take seriously. Given plural instantiation, I see no reason 
why a plurality of simples could not jointly give rise to a single instance of a given emergent 
property.  The factors that might be taken to disqualify individual simples from being suitable 
bearers of emergent properties are not present when we consider a plurality of such entities:  The 
LQGLYLGXDO VLPSOH LVQRW OHW·VJUDQW VSDWLDOO\H[WHQGHGEXW WKHSOXUDOLW\ LVGLVSHUVHGDFURVV WKH
same region of space that any emergent property they collectively instantiate would be extended 
over. An unextended simple cannot be qualitatively heterogeneous, but the plurality can be 
simply in virtue of different members of the plurality possessing differing (qualitatively 
homogeneous) properties.     
7KHQLKLOLVW·VRSSRQHQWDVVXPHVWKDWWKDWZKHQZHKDYHDFDse of emergence, we have some 
simples that give rise to some further particular that instantiates the emergent property in question.18 
On the Plural Instantiation strategy, by contrast, no further entity is posited ² there are just the 
simples, which jointly instantiate the emergent property. They cut out the middleman, so to 
speak. Instantiation here is not taken to be a one-RQHUHODWLRQEHWZHHQVRPHREMHFW¶WKHSOXUDOLW\·
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and the emergent property being instantiated; rather it is a many-one relation between the many 
VLPSOHVRQWKHRQHKDQGDQGWKHHPHUJHQWSURSHUW\RQWKHRWKHUZH·UHQRWHPSOR\LQJUXQRI
the mill one-one instantiation here. This is what allows the proponent of this strategy to posit 
some simples arranged brain-wise, say, that together inVWDQWLDWH WKH HPHUJHQW SURSHUW\ ¶EHLQJ
FRQVFLRXV·ZLWKRXW WKHUHE\ FRPSRVLQJ VRPH IXUWKHUREMHFW DEUDLQ ,W·V DOVRZKDWPDNHV WKLV
strategy somewhat revisionary. Indeed, this whole approach hinges on the plausibility of 
introducing plural instantiation. Do I have an argument for plural instantiation? Only that there 
is a dearth of arguments against it and no obvious cost involved in employing it in our 
WKHRUL]LQJ,QZKDWIROORZVZH·OO WU\ WRJHWFOHDURQZKDWH[DFWO\WKHYLHZHQWDLOVDQG,·OO WU\ WR
deal with any potential worries or misunderstandings that arise along the way. 
From the outset plural instantiation should be distinguished from multiple instantiation.19 A 
property is multiply instantiated if it has many separate instances: Red is multiply instantiated 
since there are many red things. Each of these red things is a separate instance of redness. Plural 
instantiation, on the other hand, occurs when there is more than one object contributing to the 
very same instance of a property. For example, the fleas collectively engulf the cat, but no flea 
individually engulfs him: there is just one instance of the property of engulfing a cat in the 
vicinity of the cat.  Call any property which is plurally instantiated a plural property. A property 
that is not plural is singular. It might help here to distinguish a collective predicate from a 
distributive predicate: if a distributive predicate F applies to some things then those things are F 
because each of those things is individually F. However, if a collective predicate G applies to 
some things then those things are G but none of those things is, by itself, G. If our language is 
wearing its metaphysics on its sleeve, then distributive predicates will predicate singular properties of 
things, while collective predicates will predicate plural properties of things. Being a plural 
property is not the same thing as being a relation, even though both involve many things 
participating in bringing about the one property instance. As we shall see, the monadic property / 
relation distinction crosscuts the plural / singular distinction, allowing for monadic plural properties 
and singular relations. For example, if the chairs are three metres away from the stage, it is true 
of each of the chairs individually that they are three metres away from the stage: this is a 
straightfoUZDUG VLQJXODU UHODWLRQ DQG ¶WKUHH PHWUHV IURP· LV D GLVWULEXWLYH DV RSSRVHG WR D
collective, predicate). 
On the other hand, consider the following couple of examples: First, the citizens of a 
democracy collectively enjoy sovereignty, while no individual citizen is sovereign. Intuitively, 
DOWKRXJKZHPLJKWVRPHWLPHVVSHDNRIWKH ¶7KH3HRSOH·DV LI LWZHUHVRPHVLQJXODUFRPSRVLWH
HQWLW\ WKDW DORQH HQMR\V VRYHUHLJQW\ ZH ZDQW WR VD\ WKDW LW·V WKH LQGLYLGXDO SHRSOH FRQVLGHUHG
jointly that have sovereignty, not some hypothetical mereological sum of those people. Second, 
Jess looks up at the night sky and declares that the stars are beautiful: Asked if any individual star 
LVEHDXWLIXORQLWVRZQVKH·VLQFOLQHGWRUHVSRQGLQWKHQHJDWLYH² sure, an individual star can be 
TXLWHSUHWW\EXWLWLVDIWHUDOOMXVWDWLQ\SLQSULFNRIOLJKW$VNHGLILW·VWKH arrangement of the stars 
ZKLFKLVEHDXWLIXOVKH·VDOVRLQFOLQHGWRDQVZHUQHJDWLYHO\WKHLUEHLQJDUUDQJHGLQDFHUWDLQZD\
in the sky contributes to the stars themselves being beautiful, but the arrangement itself would be 
QRWKLQJVSHFLDOLIWKHVWDUVZHUHVXEVWLWXWHGIRUVDOWFU\VWDORUWHDOHDYHV1RDFFRUGLQJWR-HVVLW·V
the stars that ² jointly ² LQVWDQWLDWHWKHPRQDGLFSURSHUW\RIEHDXW\,WGRHVQ·WVHHP OLNH-HVV·V
opinion is crazy or incoherent.  
You might quibble about whether sovereignty or beauty are genuinely monadic properties. 
What we have in each case is a monadic, collective predicate³ but plausibly in these cases our 
language GRHVQ·Wwear its metaphysics on its sleeve, and there is no genuinely plural property being 
predicated. Certainly, unless we think the properties in question are emergent, these are not 
fundamental properties corresponding to the collective predicate: thus we will say that such 
properties are ultimately grounded in the parts and the external relations between them after all.  
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But whatever the ultimate metaphysical structure of the cases, we can makH VHQVH RI ¶LV
VRYHUHLJQ· DQG ¶LV EHDXWLIXO· DV EHLQJ PRQDGLF FROOHFWLYH SUHGLcates in ordinary language: the 
claim that there are plural properties is just the claim that at least some of the time these sorts of 
predications correspond directly with the underlying metaphysics. That there is any place for 
plural instantiation in serLRXVPHWDSK\VLFVRUIXQGDPHQWDOUHDOLW\LVSUHFLVHO\ZKDW,·PDUJXLQJLQ
the paper as a whole, with respect to emergent properties; but you should at least be convinced 
that the idea of a jointly instantiated monadic property is coherent.   
To help get clearer on the various distinctions at work, we can consider the number of 
argument places had by a predicate standing for a given property or relation. Predicates of 
PRQDGLFSURSHUWLHVKDYHMXVWRQHDUJXPHQWSODFH)RUH[DPSOH¶BBBLVEHDXWLIXO·KDVRQHVSace 
to be filled. Whereas a two-SODFHGUHODWLRQVXFKDV¶BBBORYHVBBB·KDVWZRVSDFHVWREHILOOHG$
VLQJXODUSURSHUW\RUUHODWLRQKDVHDFKVSDFHILOOHGE\DVLQJOHREMHFWIRULQVWDQFH¶7KH0RUQLQJ
6WDULVEHDXWLIXO·DQG¶7URLOXVORYHV&UHVVLGD·UHVSectively. A plural property or relation, on the 
RWKHUKDQGKDV DW OHDVWRQHDUJXPHQWSODFH ILOOHGE\PRUH WKDQRQHREMHFW)RUH[DPSOH ¶WKH
LQGLYLGXDOO\ XQUHPDUNDEOH VWDUV DUH FROOHFWLYHO\ EHDXWLIXO· DQG ¶WKH LQGLYLGXDOO\ WLQ\ IOHDV
(collectively) HQJXOIWKHFDW·7KHLQWXLWLYHSRLQWLVWKDWHDFKDUJXPHQWSODFHLQDUHODWLRQDVVLJQVD
distinctive role to the object or objects that fill that place: while a case of plural instantiation is 
where many objects collaborate to play the one role and so collectively fill the one argument 
place. To reiterate, all the putative examples of plural instantiation above have been provided just 
WRKHOSWKHUHDGHUJHWDIL[RQZKDWSOXUDO LQVWDQWLDWLRQLVVXSSRVHGWREHLWGRHVQ·WPDWWHUIRU
these purposes if you don·W DJUHH WKDW DQ\ RI WKHVH DUH JHQXLQH FDVHV RI SOXUDO LQVWDQWLDWLRQ
provided you understand what is being claimed. It seems fairly obvious to me that the English 
ODQJXDJHKDVLUUHGXFLEO\FROOHFWLYHSUHGLFDWHVVXFKDV¶VXUURXQG·² DQGLQGHHG¶FRPSRVH·² but 
WKDW·V DOVR RUWKRJRQDO WR WKH GHEDWH KHUH :KDW·V DW LVVXH LV ZKHWKHU WKH QLKLOLVW LV IUHH WR
introduce plurally instantiated properties into her ontology in order to meet the challenge from 
emergence.     
Given all this, I see no conceptual barrier to the nihilist holding that the many simples are the 
collective bearers of a single, monadic emergent property. You might worry that including plural 
properties in your ontology requires significant revision to your logic. However, as Byeong-Uk 
Yi (1999, 2002, 2005, 2006) and others20 have demonstrated, we can accommodate plural 
properties simply with the introduction of plural quantifiers and plural predicates to elementary 
logic (PFO+). Given the relative ease with which such predicates can be accommodated,GRQ·W
WKLQNWKHUH·VDQ\VXVWDLQDEOHREMHFWLRQWRHIIHFWWKDWWKHYHU\LGHDSOXUDOSURSHUWLHVLVFRQIXVHG
or that formulating a theory in a language that contains plural predicates would be overly 
DUGXRXV RU XQDWWUDFWLYHO\ UHYLVLRQDU\  7KDW LV , GRQ·t think a metaphysics containing 
fundamentally collective properties or plural instantiation can be dismissed out of hand. 21   
Having argued for the coherence of the plural instantiation strategy, I will us the next two 
sections to argue that implementing the strategy does not come at too high a theoretical cost, 
while in the final section I defend the strategy from a worry that consciousness cannot be 
plurally instantiated and so is out of the reach of my general strategy³ this latter discussion also 
enables me to clarify how my defence of the Plural Instantiation represents a novel contribution 
to the debate. If everything I say in this section and the subsequent section goes through, I think 
we have enough to conclude that the Plural Instantiation strategy is a serious and attractive 
option for the nihilist who wishes to accommodate ontological emergence. 
  
3. The Cost of Plural Instantiation 
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:H·YHVHHQ WKDW WKHQLKLOLVWFDQDFFRPPRGDWHHPHUJHQWSURSHUWLHV LQKHU WKHRU\ LI WKH\DUH
plurally instantiated properties. But just because the nihilist is at liberty to introduce plural 
properties into her theory without falling into conceptual confusion or straying beyond the 
SKLORVRSKLFDOSDOHGRHVQ·WQHFHVVDULO\PHDQLWZRXOGEHSUXGHQWWRGRVR6XFKDPRYHPD\VWLOO
come at a cost: the price of introducing plural instantiation into your theory may be one that the 
nihilist would be unwilling, or unwise, to pay. How might that price be exacted? Plausibly 
WKURXJK UHGXFLQJ WKH RQWRORJLFDO RU LGHRORJLFDO VLPSOLFLW\ RI WKH QLKLOLVW·V WKHRU\ :H·OO DVVHVV
HDFK SRVVLELOLW\ LQ WXUQ ,Q HDFK FDVH ZH·OO VHH WKDW DW WKH FHQWUH RI WKH FRQWURYHUV\ LV WKH
strateg\·VUHOLDQFHRQSOXUDOTXDQWLILFDWLRQ7KHQLKLOLVWQHHGVWREHDEOHWRTXDQWLI\SOXUDOO\RYHU
some things in order to say of them that they satisfy a given collective predicate and thus plurally 
instantiate an emergent property. For, ex hypothesis LW·V Qot the case that any individual thing 
LQVWDQWLDWHV DQ HPHUJHQW SURSHUW\ DQG VR LW·V QRW WUXH RI DQ\ LQGLYLGXDO WKLQJ WKDW PLJKW EH
picked out by a singular existential quantifier that it satisfies a collective predicate.           
Many have worried that plural quantification is not ontologically innocent.22 The worry is that 
our best metaphysical theory is not only ontologically committed to each thing in the domain of 
LWVVLQJXODUH[LVWHQWLDOTXDQWLILHUEXWDOVRWRHYHU\¶SOXUDOLW\·LQWKHGRPDLQRILWVSlural quantifier, 
should the theory contain one. The thought is we should extend the Quinean criterion of 
ontological commitment23 to cover not only singular variables bound by the singular existential 
quantifier, but plural variables bound by the plural quantifier. I take it the primary motivation 
here is the feeling that it would somehow be unprincipled or arbitrary to refuse to extend the 
Quinean criterion to new quantifiers you introduce into your language: after all the same thing is 
going on in both cases; variables being bound by existential quantifiers.24 However, this puts the 
cart before the horse as far as ontological commitment is concerned. If anything is going to be a 
SULPLWLYH LQ RQWRORJ\ LW·V JRLQJ WR EH WKH QRWLRQ RI H[LVWHQFH LWVHOI %HLQJ Ls not going to be 
analysed away: to be is not literally to be the value of a variable. What I take to be attractive about 
the Quinean criterion is that it picks out all those entities that play some role in our fundamental 
theory and are therefore indispensable to it: if we felt the need to predicate something of an 
REMHFW WKHQ LW FOHDUO\ SOD\V D UROH LQ RXU WKHRU\ 2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG LI ZH GLGQ·W SUHGLFDWH
DQ\WKLQJRILWLW·VQRWFOHDUZKDWUROHLWFRXOGSRVVLEO\SOD\LQWKHWKHRU\DQGWKHUHIRUHZK\WKH 
theory should acknowledge its existence. The criterion does a nice job of counting up all the 
things we would intuitively suppose need to exist in order for our theory to be true.  
However, things get more complicated when we bring plural quantification into the picture. 
7KLQNLQJIRUDPRPHQWDERXW<L·VDFFRXQWRIQXPEHUVDVSOXUDOO\LQVWDQWLDWHGSURSHUWLHV
might help to bring this out. Given plural properties, incurring a plural commitment to some things 
that are (that is, have the property of being) seven is ² intuitively, at least ² to incur a commitment to 
VHYHQWKLQJVQRWWRRQH WKLQJ WKH ¶VRPHWKLQJV· WKDWDUHVHYHQRUWRHLJKWWKLQJV² the seven 
WKLQJSOXVWKH¶VRPHWKLQJV·7KLVLVVXSSRVHGWREHZKDWGLVWLQJXLVKHVWKHSOXUDOVWUDWHJ\IURP 
various surrogate strategies that attribute the singular property of seven-ness to some further 
entity, in virtue of its relationship to the seven things, such as having them as parts or members. 
Seven-ness, on the plural view, is something that can only be instantiated jointly by seven 
HQWLWLHV %XW LI ZH·UH DOUHDG\ FRPPLWWHG WR WKH VHYHQ WKLQJV IRU LQGHSHQGHQW UHDVRQV ² for 
instance, because our theory says each of them possesses certain singular properties ² then we 
VKRXOGQ·W FRXQW WKHP again (plurally this time, rather than individually) when we attribute to 
WKHP MRLQWO\ WKH SURSHUW\ RI EHLQJ VHYHQ 7KH SRLQW LV QRW WKDW WKH SOXUDO TXDQWLILHU LVQ·W
ontologically committing³ I think it is. If you only had a plural quantifier in your ideology you 
could still read your ontological commitments off that quantifier alone: being ontologically 
committed to a plurality of seven things is not less ontologically committing than being 
ontological committed to seven things via singular quantification³ so, strictly VSHDNLQJ LW·V
wrong to say the plural quantifier is ontologically innocent. Rather, the point is that if you already 
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KDYHWKHVLQJXODUTXDQWLILHULQ\RXUODQJXDJH\RXGRQ·WLQFXUH[WUDRQWRORJLFDOFRPPLWPHQWVMXVW
by adding another quantifier: both are quantifying over the same beings.        
I think the really pressing challenge the nihilist needs to face is not that plural quantification 
complicates her ontology, but that it complicates her ideology: ideological commitments are 
incurred by adding primitive vocabulary to the language of your fundamental theory, and the 
plural existential quantifier needed by languages containing plural instantiation is just such a 
primitive³ it is interdefinable with the plural universal quantifier, just as the singular existential 
quantifier is interdefinable with the singular universal quantifier, but is not definable in terms of 
the singular quantifiers (see Yi 2002).25 If the nihilist has to expand her ideology in order temploy 
the Plural Instantiation Strategy, this cost might be weighed against the gains the nihilist claims 
for eliminating parthood from her ideology.26 
2QHZD\IRUWKHQLKLOLVW WRUHVSRQGLV MXVW WRFRQFHGHWKDW WKHUH·VQR LGHRORJLFDOSDUVLPRQ\
gain to be had by swapping the parthood relation for plural qXDQWLILFDWLRQ EXW WKLV GRHVQ·W
diminish the importance of the ontological parsimony gained by eliminating  composite objects 
from her ontology: belief in composition comes with both an ontological commitment to 
composites and an ideological commitment to parthood, whereas nihilism with plural 
quantification at least reduces are ontological commitments ² since, as I argued above, adding a 
plural quantifier to a language with singular quantification is ontological innocent, even if the 
plural quantifier itself is ontologically committing. Now, I think this nihilist rightly points out an 
important gain in ontological parsimony, but is needlessly concessive concerning the ideological 
cost of plural quantification.  The ideology objection all rests on what, exactly, the ideological 
cost of introducing the apparatus of plural quantification into your theory is, and I think the 
nihilist should say that the cost ² if any ² is negligible when you already have singular 
quantification in your ideology. The argument is structurally similar to the one I ran above 
concerning ontology: by having singular quantification in your ontology is already to incur the 
cost of having quantificational apparatus in your ontology, so although plural quantification is a 
significant ideological cost, it is not a significant additional cost for the nihilist relative to the 
believer in composition.     
As Sider (2013) points out, and Goodman (1951) before him, not all ideological costs are 
created equal. However, if the nihilist wants to say that the cost of introducing a plural quantifier 
into her ideology is somehow minimal or negligible the burden of proof is on her. Such 
arguments can be tricky, given the many seemingly intractable issues surrounding theory choice 
methodology in general, but I think the intuitive case that can be made at least manages to shift 
the initial burden of proof away from the nihilist and onto her opponent. /HW·VVD\\RXKDGQR
quantificational apparatus in your theory at all: adding some quantificational apparatus into your 
theory would greatly enhance its power for a corresponding reduction in simplicity. However, 
OHW·VVD\\RX·UHOLNH.ULV0F'DQLHORU-DVRQ7XUQHUDIDQRIWKHUHEHLQJPDQ\ZD\V
of being³ e.g. you think numbers exist in a different way from chairs (abstractly vs. concretely), 
or spacetime points in a different way from tropes (absolutely vs. relative to a spatial location), 
where this is not merely down to these things having different properties, but in literally existing 
in a different way. Turner and McDaniel both cash this ways of being talk out in term of there 
EHLQJ GLIIHUHQW IXQGDPHQWDO TXDQWLILHUV LQ RQH·V LGHRORJ\ FRUUHVSRQGLQJ WR HDFK ZD\ WKDW
something could exist: thus, rather than having just the one fundamental quantifier, ژ, that 
ranges over everything, they have two quantifiers, ژC and ژA, say, that range over concrete and 
abstract things respectively (ژ can be defined in terms of ژC and ژA, but it is not ² or does not 
have to be ² SDUWRIWKHLUIXQGDPHQWDOLGHRORJ\$GGLQJDTXDQWLILHUZLWKDVXEVFULSWVKRXOGQ·W
count as a significant addition to your ideology when you already have a quantifier in your 
WKHRU\<RXDOUHDG\KDYHTXDQWLILFDWLRQDODSSDUDWXVLQ\RXUODQJXDJH\RX·UHMXst re-tasking that 
apparatus in a slightly different way. I would say it still is a complication to your ideology 
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compared to the person with just one quantifier, but it is not of the same order as adding in 
quantificational apparatus to a theory that lacks it entirely: By adding another quantifier when 
you already have one is not to double your ideological commitments related to quantification.  
On way of further motivating this thought ² at least in the particular cases under discussion ²
LVWKDWZH·UHPXOtiplying tokens, not types. Many have followed Lewis27 in thinking that, when it 
comes to ontology, qualitative parsimony matters, but quantitative parsimony does not³ adding 
a new type of entity to your theory counts against it when judging its simplicity, while adding 
PRUHHQWLWLHVRIDNLQGDOUHDG\PHQWLRQHGLQ\RXUWKHRU\GRHVQ·WPDNHLWDQ\OHVVSDUVLPRQLRXV
One way in which you might apply the qualitative / quantitative distinction found in the 
discussion on ontological parsimony to ideology28 is to say that adding a new bit of ideology to 
your theory is analogous to adding a new type of thing to your ontology, whereas the number of 
times you employ that ideology in your theory is analogous to adding a new thing of the same 
type  to your ontology ² e.g. the difference between adding a primitive modal operator or not, on 
the one hand, and saying of thousand and one things rather than a thousand things that they are 
possible, on the other. There may be some mileage LQWKLVDQDORJ\EXWKHUH·VDQRWKHr, perhaps 
equally useful one: adding a bit of ideology that is structurally different is adding something of a 
new type, whereas, adding a structurally identical bit of ideology is just adding more of the same 
rather than adding something of a new type. By structurally identical, I mean in the way ² for 
instance ² a distribution might be said to be structurally analogous. If I have three cakes and you 
have one, that distribution is structurally identical to the distribution in which you have three 
cakes and I have one: the form or type of distribution is just the same, the only difference is in 
what individuals fill the roles in that distribution. A new quantifier is just more quantifiers: it 
GRHVQ·WPDWWHUZKHWKHUWKHROGRQHUDQJHGRYHUFRQFUHWDEXWWKHQHZUDQJes over abstracta, or ² 
indeed ² whether the old one ranges over individuals and the new one ranges over pluralities.29  
So, is plural quantification as big a cost as having composition in your ideology?30 $V ,·YH
argued that the cost of introducing plural quantification into your ideology is negligible if you 
already have singular quantification in your ideology, the cost of having parthood in your 
ideology rather than plural quantification will be significant, unless the cost of adding parthood 
WR\RXULGHRORJ\LVLWVHOIQHJOLJLEOH%XWWKHUH·VQRUHDVRQWRWKLQNWKDWKDYLQJSDUWKRRGLQ\RXU
ideology is negligible ² in fact, we have good reason to think that the cost is significant. The 
QLKLOLVW GRHVQ·W KDve any mereological primitives in her language (Sider 2013), whereas the 
believer in composition needs at least one, and the jump from none to one is the most 
LGHRORJLFDOO\FRVWO\LW·VWKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQKDYLQJQRPHUHRORJLFDOVWUXFWXUHLQ\RXUWKHRU\ at 
DOODQGKDYLQJDZKROHGRPDLQRIPHUHRORJLFDOIDFWVLQYROYLQJWKLVSULPLWLYH,W·VWKHHTXLYDOHQW
of adding your first quantifier to your language to create a theory capable of expressing rich 
quantificational structure; or adding a primitive necessity or tense operator to your theory, in 
order to accommodate a domain of modal or temporal facts: once you have one primitive in a 
domain the expressive benefits of adding more are limited, and the ideological cost 
correspondingly more modest. If the believer in composition thinks their favoured mereological 
SULPLWLYHLV LGHRORJLFDOO\ LQQRFHQWLW·VXSWRKHUWRVD\ZK\³ DQGVKHFDQ·WDSSHDOWRWKHVDPH
reasoning that the nihilist has available to show that plural quantification is no additional 
ideological cost.    
To sum up, then, the plural instantiation strategy provides the nihilist with a way to answer 
WKHFKDOOHQJHIURPHPHUJHQFHWKDWGRHVQ·WUHO\RQWKHHPSLULFDOO\YXOQHUDEOHSUHPLVHWKDWWKHUH
is no such thing as emergence. By accommodating emergent properties in her ontology, this 
strategy also allows the nihilist to enjoy any of the theoretical benefits claimed by the believer in 
emergence. The cost of plural instantiation is its reliance on plural quantification: bXW,·YHDUJXHG
that if you already hDYHVLQJXODUH[LVWHQWLDOTXDQWLILFDWLRQ LQ\RXU ODQJXDJH\RXGRQ·W LQFXUDQ\
extra commitments ² ontological or ideological ² by introducing plural quantification. So, in so 
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far as there is an ideological or ontological advantage to being a nihilist (which is not for us to 
adjudicate here), this is not eroded or cancelled by employing plural instantiation in order to 
account for emergent properties.31 In the next section I defend this view from a potential 
objection that the principle of ideological parsimony I appeal to undercuts any reason to think 
nihilism is parsimonious in the first place. In the final section, I want to discuss a worry that 
consciousness is especially resistant to plural instantiation and so will resist my general approach 
to dealing with emergent properties.  
 
4. A Principle of  Ideological Parsimony 
How to decide when adding new ideology to your theory counts as a genuine theoretical cost 
or not? As explained in the previous section, it seems implausible to say that all additions to our 
ideology should be treated equally when evaluating a theory for ideological parsimony. The 
WURXEOHLVLWUHPDLQVWHPSWLQJWRWUHDWDQ\JLYHQDGGLWLRQDVMXVWDVFRVWO\DVDQ\RWKHUVLQFHLW·V
hard to come up with a principled and intelligible schema that weighs relative losses or gains of  
ideological parsimony in a more nuanced way. By arguing in the previous section that adding 
plural quantification to your ideology when you already have singular quantification is not a 
significant cost, this raises questions about the precise nature of, and justification for, the 
intended weighting schema I have obliquely appealed to. Saying more here is inevitably going to 
EHWULFN\,·OOFRPHFOHDQULJKWDZD\WKDW,GRQ·WKDYHDSUHFLVHDQGREYLRXVO\FRUUHFWPHWKRGIRU
weighing up ideological parsimony costs. What I propose instead, is to discuss a version of  such 
a principle that has recently been proposed in the literature, saying what I think it gets right and, 
crucially, showing where it goes wrong. The discussion ensuing should, to some extent, better 
clarify and justify my own approach.  
The view I have in mind is that of  Sam Cowling (2013), which seeks to draw a distinction 
between qualitative ideological parsimony and quantitative ideological parsimony (analogous to the 
distinction often drawn between types of  ontological parsimony). The basic idea is that 
complicating your theory with a new kind of  ideology is costly, but adding more of  the same 
kind of  ideology is not: on the face of  it, this is more or less the same line I was pushing in the 
SUHYLRXVVHFWLRQ+RZHYHULI ZH·UHJRLQJWRVSHOORXWWKHSULQFLSOHLQWHUPVRI LGHRORJLFDONLQGV
then I believe Cowling to be far too liberal on what he counts as a kind. The stakes are high for 
me here as, if  Cowling is correct about how a qualitative principle of  ideological parsimony 
(qual-IP) would operate, then it turns out, according to Cowling, that nihilism itself  is shown not 
have any ideological parsimony advantage over theories which have parthood in their ideology. 
Since it would be somewhat self-GHIHDWLQJ RI  PH WR DUJXH WKDW WKH QLKLOLVW·V EHVW ZD\ WR
accommodate emergence does not lead to ideological bloat by appealing to a principle that 
would undercut any ideological parsimony advantages of  nihilism from the outset, by arguing 
WKDW&RZOLQJ·VSRVLWLRQRQZKHQZHJHWLGHRORJ\IRUIUHHLVWRROLEHUDO,·PQRWMXVWGHOLQHDWLQJP\
own position but responding to a potential objection to my entire strategy. Hence, a detailed 
GLVFXVVLRQRI &RZOLQJ·VSDUWLFXODUYLHZLVZarranted.       
Cowling initially motivates his case by appealing to the obvious innocence of  equivalent or 
interdefinable bits of  ideology: in the modal case, admitting a diamond operator into one's 
language is not an extra cost over and above a primitive box operator. So, just counting ideology in 
\RXU WKHRU\ LVQ·W WKH ZD\ WR JR ZKHQ ZHLJKLQJ XS LGHRORJLFDO FRVWV &RZOLQJ·V JORVV RQ WKLV
possibility is of  the same ideological kind ² the modal kind ² as necessity, so once you have 
primitive modality of  any sort all the rest comes for free. So far, this seems very much in keeping 
with sort of  principle I want to appeal to in the previous section. However, Cowling claims a 
qualitative principle of  ideological parsimony can be wielded to show that parthood is 
sufficiently similar to identity to be no cost over and above identity, thereby undercutting any 
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putative ideological parsimony gains for endorsing nihilism. Obviously, if  such a principle is 
going to be so liberal as to count the cost of  identity and parthood as one and the same, then 
DQ\ DSSHDO WR LW ZLOO VDERWDJH P\ DWWHPSW LQ WKH SUHYLRXV VHFWLRQ WR VKRUH XS QLKLOLVP·V
ideological parsimony advantage on the Plural Instantiation Strategy. 
 Can we make sense of  the idea that composition is just like identity, only differing in the 
number or types of  entities it concerns? Well, yes, easily enough, in that we can take composition 
to be the very same relation as identity, except holding between an individual and an (identical) 
plurality, rather than between an individual and an (identical) individual. But this is composition 
as identity in a strong form: the highly committal and controversial thesis that the whole is the 
very same thing as its parts. Sure, if  we are prepared to assent to that WKHQWKHUH·VDVWURQJFODLP
WKDWFRPSRVLWLRQLVQRFRVWRYHUDQGDERYHLGHQWLW\OHW·VQRWTXLEEOHRYHUPXFKDERXWWKHH[WUD
expressive power given to the identity relation here.32 
Yet Cowling seems to be presenting an argument that is neutral on strong CAI, and arguing 
from mere superficial similarities between parthood and identity that parthood is no cost over 
and above identity (2013, p.3906): 
Like identity, it contributes nothing to the non-structural, qualitative character of the 
world, and, like identity, facts about its general nature seem to be a non-contingent matter. 
Furthermore, regardless of whether one endorses nihilism, classical extensional mereology 
demands certain conceptual ties between these relations. Most notably, the uniqueness of 
composition precludes distinct entities being composed of the very same objects.    
:KLOH,·PSHUIHFWO\KDSS\WRDFFHSWWKDWSDUWKRRGDORQJZLWKLGHQWLW\GHVHUYHVWKHVWDWXVRI 
D¶EURDGO\ORJLFDOUHODWLRQ·DQGZRXOGHYHQJRIXUWKHUDQGDVVHQWWo the claim that parthood is an 
identity-like relation in a meaningful sense, the gestured-to similarities are much looser than those 
present in the strong CAI case and, in my opinion, just not enough to support the claim that 
parthood is no cost over and above identity. Identity is a relation that never holds between 
distinct entities, while composition is a relation between some entities and some further, distinct 
entity ² however closely qualitatively related the distinct entity may be to the other entities. To 
reject this fundamental difference between composition and identity is to endorse strong CAI. 
7KHUH·VQRVHQVHKHUHLQZKLFKDZHOOXQGHUVWRRGLGHQWLW\UHODWLRQLVVLPSO\EHLQJJLYHQHQKDQFHG
expressive power to take more or different kinds of  entities into its fold: rather, we have two 
entirely different, incompatible ideological primitives that are noted to be similar in interesting 
ways, but which must ultimately be treated separately. As such, the qualitative ideological 
parsimony principle as CRZOLQJSUHVHQWVLWGRHVQRWSURYLGHD¶QRYHOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ·SRI 
CAI in any substantive sense: either it should be read as a plea for full-fledged CAI along the 
usual lines, or as merely drawing attention to certain similarities between composition and 
identity which have no doubt contributed to the motivation behind weak forms of  CAI in the 
past ² either way, there is no new argument against nihilism.       
So, is there any hope for extending a Cowling-esque principle of  qualitative ideological 
parsimony beyond rather conservative observations about interdefinable operators:  that no one 
ZDQWV WRSD\H[WUD WRHPSOR\DER[RSHUDWRU LQ WKHLU WKHRU\ LI  WKH\·UH Dlready committed to a 
diamond operator, and that debates concerning whether to either take the box operator or the 
diamond operator as primitive have the smell of  non-VXEVWDQWLYLW\&RZOLQJ·VSURSRVDOWRXVHLW
to merge the ideological cost of  two primitive notions that are in some sense similar yet 
ultimately independent of  one DQRWKHU LVQ·W JRLQg to fly: at least not without some further 
DUJXPHQWWREDFNLWXS+RZHYHU,GRWKLQNWKHUH·VDSODXVLEOHDQGLQWHUHVWLQJZD\EHVLGHVER[
and diamond type cases, in which an ideological notion can be no (significant) cost over and 
above another, closely related, ideological notion. This is where we start with an established 
ideological primitive and then augment our theory with a new notion that does basically the same 
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work as the old primitive but, say, involves objects from different ontological categories or 
involves a different number of  objects or, more generally, allows that primitive to apply in 
different situations or to the same things in a different way. You may well then be in a situation 
to posit a new, more general, primitive that subsumes the original two ² one that, from your new 
dialectical position can be cast as removing restrictions on the old primitive ² or it may be that 
the old primitive can be defined in terms of  the new more powerful or applicable primitive, such 
that it takes on the role of  the general, subsuming primitive. In any case, this is obviously 
importantly different from the case of  two interGHILQDEOHSULPLWLYHVDQG,WDNHLWZH·re on more 
controversial ground. This is because, despite the hope of  being able to get rid of  one primitive 
by defining it terms of  the other being present in both cases, adding the new primitive increases 
the overall expressiveness of  the theory, even if  it ultimately subsumes, or is subsumed by, a 
different primitive of  the theory.    
Perhaps the best example to discuss, especially in the given context, is when you start out with 
a primitive that works in the manner of  a one-one function and then add a primitive that does 
the same theoretical work, except in the manner of  one-many function. For example: is it a 
complication of  our theory to allow for variably polyadic relations? For instance, take the debate 
between Karen Bennett (2011) and L. A. Paul (2012), on the one hand, who argue broadly that 
FRPSRVLWLRQ RU ¶EXLOGLQJ UHODWLRQV· VKRXOG EH WUHDWHG DV D XQLILHG VLQJOH UHODWLRQ DFURVV ZLGHO\
different theoretical roles and categories, despite holding between different numbers and kinds 
of  relata in each case. On the other hand, Kris McDaniel (2010) argues that the composition 
relation should be considered a fundamentally different relation, with a different adicity, when 
employed for certain theoretical purposes compared to others: specifically, with spatial parthood 
holding between regions and sub-regions, while concrete parthood holds between a concrete 
whole, a part and a spatial region. The two sorts of  views, while not straightforwardly 
incompatible, suggest two radically different pictures of  the ideology of  composition: one on 
which we have multiple primitives, each dealing with a fixed number of  entities and entities in 
specific ontological categories; another on which we just have the one primitive that can deal 
with a varying number of  entities across all relevant ontological categories. One thing which 
would look very bad to say is that we should simply dismiss the McDaniel picture out of  hand, 
since going down this route will commit us to more than one parthood primitive. Here the 
quantitative/qualitative distinction could be put to work in explaining the intuition that whatever 
substantive issues may (or may not) be at stake between the Bennett-Paul picture and the 
McDaniel picture, that one does not have the advantage over the other on grounds of  
parsimony. Furthermore, though, by accepting that the posited composition relations in 
McDaniel belong to the same close-NQLWIDPLO\RI QRWLRQVZHVHHWKDW0F'DQLHOGRHVQ·WKDYHWR
pay a significant ideological cost for belief  in both spatial composition and concrete composition 
compared to someone who just wanted to believe in spatial composition.      
Plural Instantiation fits this mould: Here we start out with instantiation, which is standardly 
construed as holding one-one between an object and a property, and introduce plural 
instantiation, which is taken to relate a plurality of  objects to a property in the same way that 
ordinary instantiation relates a single object to a property. To pick out the things that are to 
instantiate a given plural property, we similarly need to allow the existential quantifier to quantify 
not just over individual objects but also over pluralities: on the face of  it, we complicate our 
ideology by adding a plural quantifier, but note that the old singular quantifier can be defined in 
terms of  the new plural quantifier. Now, even on a quantitative conception of  ideological 
SDUVLPRQ\ZHJHWWKHUHVXOWWKDWWKHUH·VQRFRVWKHUHEHFDXVHRI WKHLQWHUGHILQDELOLW\RI WKHROG
primitive in terms of  the new one³ which suggests that the qualitative/quantitative distinction 
LVQ·W TXLWH JHWWLQJ WR WKH KHDUW RI  ZKDW·V JRLQJ RQ KHUH 1RQHWKHOHVV IURP WKH SUHFHGLQJ
considerations we at least have a better grasp of  the limits and potential applications of  a 
principle of  ideological parsimon\WKDWJRHVEH\RQGWKHQDwYH¶FRXQWLQJSULPLWLYHV·DSSURDFK 
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5. Fundamentality, Consciousness and Plural Instantiation 
We have seen that the plural instantiation strategy is a coherent and parsimonious way for the 
nihilist to overcome the objection from ontological emergence. In this final section, I want to 
make clear how these results advance the debate between nihilists and believers in composition 
and defend the strategy from an objection that Consciousness in particular cannot be plurally 
instantiated.  
First up, it should be clarified exactly how the plural instantiation strategy for overcoming the 
objection from ontological emergence is different from the standard nihilist strategy for dealing 
with non-emergent phenomena of employing collective predicates to stand in for singular 
predications. According to the nihilist you are correct to say that there is chair in the room, 
GHVSLWH FKDLUV QRW H[LVWLQJ EHFDXVH ¶WKHUH DUH VRPH VLPSOHV DUUDQJHG FKDLU-ZLVH· This is not 
meant as a commLWPHQWWRVRPHQHZSURSHUW\RI¶EHLQJ-arranged-chair-ZLVH·, had collectively by 
the simples³ a least, not a new fundamental property. Rather, we can truly predicate of the 
simples (collectively) that they are arranged chair-wise in virtue of the respective intrinsic 
properties of each member of the collection, taking into account the spatial relations (and other 
external relations if applicable) between each simple and every other: if there is a new property 
here in any sense, it is not something over and above how each simple is in itself and its spatial 
relation to each of the others. As such, we should say that there isn't any genuine plural 
instantiation going on at all: there is singular instantiation by simples and there are spatial 
relations between simples. Indeed, nihilists such as Sider (2013) and Cameron (2010a) will 
disavow the need to resRUW WR SDUDSKUDVHV RI WKH W\SH ¶the simples are arranged chair-ZLVH·, 
explicitly freeing them of the need include properties of being arranged F-wise or plural 
quantification in their fundamental theories.33      
Now, ,·YH argued WKDWSOXUDOTXDQWLILFDWLRQDQGLQGHHGSOXUDOLQVWDQWLDWLRQDUHQ·WDFRVWDIWHU
all: so nihilists can keep the ideology and use it to accommodate genuine ontological emergence. 
This is my ultimate diagnosis oIWKHZRUU\WKDWVLPSOHVFDQ
W¶FR-RSHUDWH· to create consciousness 
even if simples can co-operate to, e.g., create light without composing some further thing:34 if 
ZH
UH VXUH WKDW DQ\ ¶KLJKHU-OHYHO· property is fundamental, it's our own consciousness³ right? 
But fundamentally, the thought goes, there are no plurally instantiated properties: so my 
consciousness must have a single bearer (me; my brain). However we've seen, firstly, that if 
ontologically emergent properties are possible, we have a reason to include the apparatus of 
plural instantiation in our fundamental ideology and secondly, that that apparatus isn't, in the 
final analysis, a significant cost.         
Is recommending plural instantiation to the nihilist really to advance the debate? My strategy 
perhaps sounds similar to what some nihilists have had in mind all along as the solution to the 
problem of emergent consciousness. For instance, Dorr & Rosen (2002) write: 
<RXGRQ·WH[LVWEXWWKHWKLQJVyou used to think of yourself as doing get done 
all the same. Certain atoms jointly think those thoughts, dream those dreams, 
and so forth. Things seem the way they do to those atoms jointly, but not to 
any single thing.   
 
Such sentiments are all well and good. But they are also ambiguous between adopting the 
plural instantiation strategy, on the one hand, and thinking that such a strategy isQ·W needed 
because consciousness isn't emergent ² that it is simply the matter of the correct arrangement of 
the intrinsic properties of individual simples and nothing over and above that ² on the other. On 
WKH ODWWHU DVZH·YH VDLG FRQVFLRXVQHVV causes no more of a problem for the nihilist than that 
15 
 
walking is always a collective activity of many simples: there are some simples arranged walking-
wise or arranged thinking-wise. This is, of course, a perfectly respectable position ² but in this 
paper we have been interested in seeing whether nihilism can survive if we grant that there are 
genuinely ontologically emergent properties. If the former, then we are in agreement about the 
correct way to proceed, but merely gesturing to the possibility of collective activity does not by 
itself constitute a reply to the emergence objection, if plural instantiation turns out to be an 
incoherent or overly costly strategy ² I hope what I have done in this paper is to show that 
employing plural instantiation is a viable strategy. I use Rosen and Dorr·VSURQRXQFHPHQWV only as 
an example: in general, there is a need for clarity on these issues ² an appreciation of the various 
choice points ² if we are to advance the debate.    
One final objection I wish to meet head on concerns whether consciousness ² ZKLFK ,·YH
used throughout as a plausible example of a property that might be genuinely emergent ² resists 
plural instantiation due to unique aspects of its own nature. If this is right, then there would be a 
worrying lack of general applicability in my approach for dealing with emergent properties³ 
though it would still be applicable, as far as I can tell, for dealing with other plausible candidates, 
for example from Quantum Mechanics. 
Is there something special about the nature of consciousness which means it requires a single 
bearer: a single subject?35 My preferred diagnosis, above, is that this is down to nothing more 
specific about the nature of consciousness itself than the fact that emergent consciousness would 
be a fundamental property and so require the controversial apparatus of genuine plural 
instantiation. But perhaps it is rather that while genuinely plurally instantiated properties are 
perfectly possible, something very particular about the nature of consciousness makes it an 
exception to this general rule? The only viable candidate that springs to mind is the unity of 
consciousness: does the fact that all our experiences at a time seem to have a single, unified 
conscious subject, mean that consciousness itself needs to have a single bearer? While intuitive 
on first look, I find it to be a rather tenuous principle that experiential unity requires a literal 
unity ² one thing ² as a bearer, forcing conscious subjects to correspond one-one with objects in 
our onWRORJ\UDWKHUWKDQSHUPLWWLQJRXUWHUP¶FRQVFLRXVVXEMHFW· to be a shorthand way to refer 
to a plurality of things involved in instantiating the same conscious property. Can we really 
introspectively tell that our consciousness is the product of one thing, one mereological whole, 
rather than some closely co-operating things?       
The arbitrariness for the demand for what I shall call merely mereological unity ² the need for the 
simples participating in an instance of consciousness to compose some further, single thing in 
order to successfully carry out this activity ² can be brought out by seeing how demands for the 
requisite unity could, very plausibly, be either weaker or stronger. The weaker demand, which I 
need for my strategy to work, is that there be what I'll call a high degree of qualitative unity 
involved in the bringing about of consciousness: they have similar intrinsic properties, perhaps, 
are spatially close together, are closely causally connected (and whatever else you need): the very 
sorts of conditions one might expect the restricted composition theorist to require in order for 
simples to compose a conscious composite object. The thing is, though, once these conditions 
are in place is there any sense in which the collection is made interestingly more unified by 
composing some further thing? After all, this further thing consists entirely of (albeit very close 
together, highly causally integrated) disparate, spatially separated objects each doing their own 
thing: qualitatively, there is no increase in unity. Excluding the property at issue ² consciousness 
² we agree that the whole derives its properties from the parts, and so is a spatially discontinuous 
object composed of many disparate parts. The only difference is that when we point to the 
simples, according to the believer in composition, we are now also pointing to the thing the 
simples compose: but qualitatively, nothing has changed to make the conditions any more ripe for 
the instantiation of consciousness.  
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So, it really does come down to what criteria of unity you think is relevant hereDQGLW·VQRWDW
all clear how we should GHFLGH ZKDW·V UHOHYDQW 1RQHWKHOHVV \RX PLJKW VXVSHFW , DP EHLQJ
perverse in pointing out that the change in the mereological facts doesn't precipitate any further 
change in qualitative facts towards greater unification - why should we expect it to? Well, there 
are plenty of other candidate bearers for consciousness which would seem to clearly beat wholes 
composed of atoms for inherent unity in both a qualitative and a mereological sense. Consider 
the Cartesian soul: mereologically speaking it is simple, partless³ it is a pure unity, not even 
composed of a plurality of separate parts. Qualitatively, it is not a spatially discontinuous object: 
it is not even in space. Similarly, consider the view discussed briefly at the start of this paper - 
that the bearers of emergent consciousness could be extended emergent simples. Again, the 
extended simple is more unified than would be any mereological sum of the plurality that gave 
rise to it, in the sense that, being simple, it is metaphysically indivisible and cannot be partially 
one thing and partially another ² partially my consciousness, perhaps, and partially a blancmange. 
7KH0HUHRORJLFDO8QLW\0D[FULWHULRQDVZH·OOFDOOLW outdoes mere mereological unity at its own 
game. Plus, there is nothing stopping the extended simple from having greater qualitative unity: 
by not being spatially discontinuous, for example³ VR LW·V QRW DEVXUG WR GHPDQG WKDW ZKHQ
some simples are arranged in the correct way to facilitate bringing about consciousness, some 
further qualitative change takes place in the world to enable this to happen. Third and finally, 
consider the view that the early emergentists set up their view in explicit opposition to: that to 
explain the non-mechanistic features of the world we need a singular entity of an entirely 
different kind from atoms and their sums ² namely, entelechy.36 Once again the idea is that a 
FROOHFWLRQ RI PHUHRORJLFDO DWRPV MXVW LVQ·W D VXIILFLHQWO\ XQLILHG RU RI WKH UHTXLVLWH QDWXUH Wo 
instantiate novel higher-level properties: and that the wholes they compose are hardly better 
SODFHGWRSOD\WKLVUROHHLWKHU+HQFH LIZH·UHJRLQJE\LQWXLWLRQVRIUHTXLVLWHXQLW\WKHFULWHULD
could very plausibly be either stronger or ZHDNHUDQGLW·V hard to think of a principled reason for 
drawing the line precisely at the point that is favourable to traditional conceptions of ontological 
emergence but which causes trouble for the nihilist.       
Emergentism is by design a middle way between mechanistic atomism and views which 
require some metaphysically special bearer for emergent properties, such as consciousness: 
fetishizing mereological sums as having the required unity to instantiate consciousness seems to 
me a bizarre hangover from the intuitions which motivated the positing of partless objects or 
objects of a new metaphysical category as bearers for non-mechanistic-seeming properties. 
Wholes are an uncontroversial addition to the emergentist·s picture precisely because they are 
not seen as challenging the atomistic view of matter that emergentism takes as its starting point: 
they are no more mysterious than their parts. But this innocuousness which keeps them around 
in the emergentist picture also enables us to dispense with them if, as nihilists, we have 
independent reason ² and the requisite theoretical apparatus ² to exclude them from our 
ontology.        
Whatever its initial ring of plausibility, the merely mereological criterion for the unity of 
conscious bearers is, I think, something that the nihilist would do well, on reflection, just to 
reject in the absence of some more compelling argument: just as the traditional emergentist 
eschewed long standing assumptions in favour of Mereological Unity Max. If you have a general 
systematic argument for eliminating most composite object (tables; stars; molecules) which leads 
\RX WR HQGRUVHQLKLOLVP LW·V KDUG WR VHHKRZ VKDN\ LQWXLWLRQVRQ WKH H[DFWQDWXUHRI WKHXQLW\
criteria should outweigh the promise of a more systematic theory. Not so, perhaps, if you are a 
restricted composition theorist who takes it to be constitutive of composition itself that it is 
precisely the sort of unity required for consciousness: that what it is for some things to compose 
some further thing is for them to compose a conscious subject. Here we are stipulating from the 
outset that the theoretical role of mereological composition is to pick out unified conscious 
subjects. But this would be a radical and unorthodox view that would be in need of some 
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independent argument: it is certainly not the view of van Inwagen, for instance, who is explicit 
that while being a whole is necessary for consciousness, being a conscious subject is not 
necessary for (let alone constitutive of) being a mereological whole.37 Composition as Conscious 
Unity would be an interesting view which deserves attention in its own right, but it carries us far 
from the terms on which this debate is usually had and, certainly, beyond the scope and space 
constraints of this paper. As such, we should conclude that there is no good reason to think that 
the mereological unity involved in the composing of a single whole by its parts is sort of unity 
required for the instantiation of consciousness, emergent or otherwise.38 
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NOTES 
 
1 The nature of the question itself and numerous possible answers are explored at length in van 
Inwagen (1990).   
2 For a defence of the latter view and discussion of what I have called the naïve answers see van 
Inwagen (1990). Other restrictivist answers to SCQ are developed by, e.g., Markosian (1998b), (2008) and 
Merricks (2001). 
3 Defenders of universalism include: Armstrong (1997); Hudson (2001); Lewis (1986); Rea 
(1998); van Cleve (1986), (2008). 
4 The view has been defended by, among others, Peter Unger (1979), (1980), Ross Cameron 
(2010a), Cian Dorr (2005), Dorr & Gideon Rosen (2002), Ted Sider (2013). Van Inwagen (1990) and 
Trenton Merricks (2001) put forward a strong general argument for endorsing nihilism but ² DVZHZH·OO
see ² proceed to exploit lacunas in their arguments to rescue living or conscious objects (respectively) from 
elimination: as such, they are restrictivists about composition.  
5 For instance, Peter Unger (1979), (1980) advances nihilism as a solution to the Problem of the 
Many, Sider (2001) recognises it as a competitor to Stage Theory for solving the paradoxes of 
coincidence, while Merricks (2001) is moved by the worry that wholes overdetermine the effects of their 
parts to present a general argument for the elimination of composite objects (that he finds an exception 
to the general argument for wholes that have powers over and above those of their parts is something we 
will move on to discuss shortly).  
6 E.g. Cameron (2010a) defends a view on which nihilism can provide us with a minimal 
ontology; Sider (2013) argues for nihilism on the grounds that it is ideologically parsimonious. The latter 
will concern us in greater detail in §3. 
7 See Timothy O'Connor & Hong Yu Wong (2012) for an overview of emergence. Broad (1925) 
is the most prominent of the early emergentists, notably preceded by Mill (1843).  
8 Wilson (2015) provides a clear, exhaustive schema for understanding and characterising 
HPHUJHQFHGUDZLQJRQ.LP·V exclusion argument ² see, e.g., Kim (1989) and (1999) ² and building on 
many previous attempts in the literature. I will be assuming throughout this paper that ontological 
emergence should be understood as what Wilson characterises as strong emergence, remaining neutral on 
whether there is a putative problem for the nihilist of accommodating weak forms of emergence and 
whether, if so, my proposed solution is applicable to it.    
9 See Barnes (2012) for a recent discussion of the nature of fundamental dependence and its 
importance in characterising ontological emergence.  
10 McLaughlin (1992) argues that the decline of British Emergentism was due to quantum theory 
SURYLGLQJ D FRPSOHWH H[SODQDWLRQ IRU ¶KLJKHU OHYHO· SKHQRPHQD LQ FKHPLVWU\ DQG ELRORJ\ WKHUHE\
undercutting a motivation for positing ontologically emergent chemical or biological properties or laws. 
However, while quantum theory enables us to see how, e.g., chemistry is governed by the same dynamics 
as fundamental physics, these generally applicable dynamics treat multi-particle systems in a way that 
suggests their properties are not fully determined by their subsystems. The resulting picture of emergence 
is one that eschews the traditional picture of special science laws or properties emerging from the 
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fundamental laws or properties in favour of one where emergence appears to be somehow imbedded in 
the structure of the fundamental laws or properties themselves.    
11 Compare Maudlin (2007, pp.50-77). For more detailed discussion of the phenomena see, e.g., 
Esfeld (2001) or Penrose (2004).     
12  The important thing here is that van Inwagen finds at least one property of the whole not 
derived from the property of the parts. I discuss in §5 whether van Inwagen takes the nihilist not to be 
able to accommodate emergent properties generally, or just consciousness in particular.   
13 6FKDIIHU OHDYHV RSHQ WKDW ¶HQWDQJOHPHQW UHODWLRQV· FRXOG EH SRVLWHG ² new external relations 
between the simples specifically posited to ground their collective spin ² but this makes the assumption 
that what we took to be fundamental monadic spin properties of wholes can be explained away by 
stipulating that the intrinsic properties of the parts plus a brand new external relation can play the 
equivalent theoretical role. I therefore count this as explaining away emergence rather than 
accommodating LWLW·VILQHLI\RXWKLQN\RXFDQH[SODLQDZD\HPHUJHQFHEXWKHUHZHDUHQDUURZLQJRXU
focus to whether it can be accommodated).      
14 See Schaffer (2010) and Barnes (2014) respectively. 
15 See Markosian (1998a) for an in depth discussion of the nature of simples ² especially whether 
they are necessarily point-sized.   
16 See Parsons (2004); McDaniel (2007); Cameron (2010b). 
17 An interesting version of something in the vicinity of this strategy has recently been defended 
by Cotnoir (2013), relying on the possibility of extended simples and claiming to allow the nihilist to 
accommodate emergent properties. However, his parts as counterparts approach requires some explicit 
heavy duty commitments to both substantival space and fundamental distribution properties (p.237). 
$OWKRXJKWKHUHLVDQLQWHUHVWLQJGLVFXVVLRQWREHKDGRQWKHUHODWLYHPHULWVRIP\VWUDWHJ\DQG&RWQRLU·V,
have decided to use this paper to develop my own view fully rather than taking a comparative approach. 
If my view is viable it is at the very least an interesting result that a strategy exists that can do without 
&RWQRLU·V QRW LQVLJQLILFDQW WKHRUHWLFDO FRPPLWPHQWV WKDW·V QRW WR VD\ P\ YLHZ LV ZLWKRXW LWV RZQ
commitments, but merely that they are quite different³ opening up the range of options for the nihilist). 
18 This is assuming that she believes in a world that contains simples rather than one that is 
¶JXQN\· 
19 In drawing this distinction I follow Yi (2002). Elsewhere in the literature the tHUP ¶SOXUDO
LQVWDQWLDWLRQ·LVVRPHWLPHVXVHGWRUHIHUWRPXOWLSOHLQVWDQWLDWLRQ 
20 E.g. Morton (1975); Mundy (1989); Rayo (MS). 
21 Byeong-Uk Yi provides arguments for adopting plural instantiation which primarily concern its 
ability to give an attractive metaphysical account of numbers. 
22For a long list of doubters see Linnebo (2004). 
23 See Quine (1948).  
24 Compare Boolos (1984). 
25 An alternative way to look at the extra cost involved here is that the plural quantifier is more 
internally complex than the singular quantifier: as well as having a primitive logical predicate of identity the 
believer in plural quantification needs the primitive predicate is one of, to denote that a given object 
belongs to a plurality. So, the real cost of plural quantification is adding more identity-like structure to the 
WKHRU\WKH¶LVRQHRI·UHODWLRQUDWKHUWKDQPRUHTXDQWLILFDWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHDVVuch (for once one has the 
more expressive plural quantifier arguably one does not need the singular quantifier too). However, I 
think what follows will play out much the same regardless of your view you on the technicalities of where 
precisely the extra commitment lies. 
26 Sider (2013) argues for the view that eliminating parthood is an ideological economy.  
27 e.g. Lewis (1973, p.87) ² though compare Nolan (1997). 
28 $YLHZ,·YHFRPHDFURVVDQXPEHURIWLPHVLQFRQYHUVDWLRQ 
29 A very different way of arguing for this conclusion ² ZKLFK ,·P QRW UHFRPPHQGLQJ EXW LV
worth drawing attention to ² is to motivate a retreat from the very austere logical realism of Sider (2011). 
One could still think that many ideological commitments are a theoretical cost ² such a primitive modal 
or tense operators, say ² but hold the more general background features of our logical, such as identity 
and quantification, are not wordly features as such, but just necessary artefacts of theorising or thought, 
and therefore innocent. 
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30 ,·PDVVXPLQJKHUWKDW¶FRPSRVH·LVQRWDSULPLWLYHLQWKHEHOLHYHU·VWKHRU\² since composition 
itself a plural relation of the parts to the whole ² and that it can be explained in terms of a singular 
relation like parthood.  
31
 In this case, at least, we are not simply ¶SXVKLQJDEXPSDURXQGXQGHUWKHFDUSHW· as Bennett 
(2009, p.65) suggests the nihilist is prone to do³ rather, expressive power is gained without a 
corresponding loss of parsimony.     
32 See Baxter (1988a) and (1988b) for canonical formulation of CAI. See, e.g., Wallace (draft), 
(2011a), (2011b) for recent discussion and defence. 
33 Thus, says Sider (2013), exempting this sort of nihilist from the bloat of ideology and 
properties associated with need to provide paraphrases identified by Bennet (2 ,W·V LPSRUWDQW WR
emphasise that even if you are a nihilist who thinks that paraphrase apparatus, such as plural 
quantification, is heavyweight ideology you are genuinely committed to this does not make your 
paraphrases equivalent to plural instantiaWLRQIRUWKHUHDVRQVMXVWRXWOLQHGVRPHWKLQJEHLQJ¶DUUDQJHG)-
ZLVH·LVDGHULYDWLYHSURSHUW\QRWKLQJRYHUDQGDERYHKRZWKHWKLQJVLQTXHVWLRQDUHDUUDQJHG 
34 See van Inwagen (1990, p.188). 
35 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to address this issue directly.  
36 See McLaughlin (1992) for discussion of how Broad (1925) endorsed emergence as a middle 
ZD\EHWZHHQPHFKDQLVWYLHZVDQGVXEVWDQFHYLWDOLVWYLHZVVXFKDV'ULHVFK·V (1914).  
37 Van Inwagen (1990: p.120). 
38 Thanks to Elizabeth Barnes, Ross Cameron, Christopher Daly, Scott Shalkowski  and an 
anonymous referee for invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this paper, as well as to audiences at the 
University of Leeds Centre for Metaphysics and Mind Seminar and the University of Leeds PG Seminar 
for immensely useful discussion. Much of the work towards this article was enabled by the support of the 
Arts and Humanities Research Council. 
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